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Abstract 
This paper attempts to examine how the policy rate as a monetary policy stance reacts to output 
and price level in Thailand during 2005Q1 and 2016Q2. An empirical relationship that 
characterizes the way the Bank of Thailand adjusts its policy rate to output growth and inflation 
is identified. Johansen ointegration technique and VAR methodology are used in the analysis. 
The results from the cointegration analysis show that there exists a long-run relationship of the 
policy rate with real GDP and prices. This long-run equation differs from the empirical Taylor-
type rule. However, the result from short-run dynamics captures the short-run interest rate 
equation. The partial adjustment coefficient in the estimated interest rate equation is negative and 
highly significant, which indicates that any deviation of the policy rate from its equilibrium value 
is corrected by monetary policy actions. Furthermore, there is long-run causality running from 
inflation and economic growth to a change in policy rate. In the short run, economic growth 
negatively causes a change in the policy rate while inflation positively causes a change in the 
policy rate. Also, impulse response analysis from an unrestricted VAR model indicates that both 
output growth and inflation shocks cause fluctuation in the policy rate.  
Keywords: Policy rate, output, prices, error correction mechanism, impulse responses 
JEL Classification: C32, E52 
 
  
1. Introduction  
 
The Taylor rule proposed by Taylor (1993) is the simple rule that explains how the central bank 
of the United States adjusts the federal fund rate by using the current values of output gap and 
inflation in relation to their target values. In earlier empirical studies, researchers estimate 
monetary policy reaction functions for advanced countries. By pursuing monetary policy rule, the 
central banks conduct a sluggish partial adjustment of short-term policy interest rate. Clarida et 
al. (1998) estimate monetary reaction functions for Germany, Japan, the United States, France, 
Italy and the United Kingdom. They find that the success of monetary policy in Germany, Japan 
and the United States stems from an implicit adoption of inflation targeting. The central banks in 
these three countries respond to anticipated inflation rather than lagged inflation. For the other 
three countries, the central banks are heavily dominated by German monetary policy rule. Using 
the German central bank policy as a benchmark, they find that interest rate in these countries are 
higher than macroeconomic conditions when the European Monetary System collapse. 
There are some arguments in the literature pertaining to the choice of interest rate and the 
functional form of estimated equation. Minford et al. (2003) argue that an interest rate relation 
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with output and inflation does not identify a central bank reaction function because the central 
bank may follow different monetary policy rules. Mehra (2001) indicates that the United States 
Federal Reserve (Fed) reacts to long-term inflationary expectations in the post-1979 period. 
Therefore, the behavior of the long-term bond rate is more responsive to actual or expected 
inflation than the federal fund rate. Kim et al. (2005) investigate the nature of nonlinearity in the 
monetary policy rule of the Fed using the flexible approach to nonlinear inference. They find 
evidence of nonlinearity for the period to 1979, but little evidence for the subsequent period. 
Possible asymmetries in the Fed’s reactions to inflation deviations from target and output gap 
occur in the 1960s and 1970s, but do not capture the entire nature of nonlinearity. Due to some 
problems with estimation of the Taylor rule, such as misspecification and inconsistency in time 
series analysis, Eleftheriou (2009) estimates the interest rate rule for Germany and finds evidence 
of a stable interest rate rule, which is similar to the Taylor rule. The long-run relationship of the 
policy rate with output and inflation is found. Fernandez et al. (2010) find that The Fed’s partial 
adjustment of the federal fund rate toward an equilibrium rate depends on the unemployment 
rate and forward-looking inflation measures. Seip and McNown (2013) examine monetary policy 
in the United States for six periods. They find that the Fed changes interest rate in accordance 
with economic instability, i.e., movements in inflation and unemployment. Baxa et al. (2013) use 
recently developed monetary policy rule estimation methodology to be applied to the data of the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and Sweden. They find that the central 
banks in these countries often change policy rates during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. 
Most central banks respond to both stock-market stress and bank stress while they respond to 
exchange-rate stress when their economies are more open. 
In theory, monetary policy can affect both real activity and price level. In conducting monetary 
policy, a central bank simply changes the size of money supply. The simple tool exercised by 
most central banks is open market operations. If cent banks buy securities from the public, the 
size of money supply will increase, and thus output and price level should increase. On the 
contrary, when central banks sell securities to the public, the size of money supply will be 
reduced, and thus output and price level should fall. The efficacy of monetary policy can be 
enhanced by an implementation of inflation targeting. Clarida et al. (1998) give evidence 
indicating that some form of inflation targeting can be a nominal anchor for monetary policy 
rather than fixing exchange rates. The Bank of Thailand is also associated with the concept of 
inflation targeting. However, its policy operationally involves the adjustment of policy rate. 
According to International Monetary Fund, the policy rate is the rate used by the central bank to 
implement or signal its monetary policy stance. In Thailand, the decisions on the policy rate are 
taken by the Bank of Thailand monetary policy committee. The committee will lower the policy 
rate when the growth rate of the country is low and inflation tends to fall. The committee will 
leave the policy rate unchanged when it considers that the current monetary policy is appropriate 
to support the economic recovery and does not pose risks to financial stability. The adjustment 
of policy rate is shown in Figure 1. 
 
The plot of the policy rate as monetary policy stance of the bank of Thailand shows fluctuations 
in the rate. This rate increased from the first quarter of 2005 and decreased by the fourth quarter 
of 2006. The policy rate was lowest in the second quarter of 2009 and remained the same until 
the second quarter of 2010. The sharp drop of the policy rate was due to the impact of the global 
economic recession when the central banks worldwide cut policy rates sharply. Even though this 
rate increased from the third quarter of 2010, it started decreasing thereafter.  
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                                            Figure 1.  Movements in the Policy Rate. 
 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data, empirical model 
and estimations used in the analysis, Section 3 presents empirical results, and the last section 
draws conclusion. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
The dataset used in the analysis is quarterly time series. This dataset is retrieved from various 
sources. The policy rate as a measure of monetary policy stance is obtained from the Bank of 
Thailand website. Real GDP series is obtained from the Office of National Economic and Social 
Development Board while the consumer price index series is obtained from the website of 
Ministry of Commerce. The period of investigation is during 2005Q1 and 2016Q2, which is 
period of implementing inflation targeting. The number of observation is 46 because the policy 
rate series is available from 2005Q1 to 2016Q2, and thus the number of observations is limited 
by this series. The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test with constant only is used to test for unit 
root in all series, which are expressed in logarithmic series. The results of unit root tests for the 
three variables are reported in Table 1. 
Table 1 Results of Unit Root Test. 
Variable ADF statistic 
A.Level  
y (real GDP) -0.459 [6] 
p (consumer price index) -1.792 [2] 
r (policy rate) -2.189 [1] 
B. First Difference  
∆y -4.108***[5] 
∆p -6.665***[1] 
∆r -3.632***[0] 
Note: The number in bracket is the optimal lag length determined by Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC). *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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The results in Table 1 show that all variables are integrated of order 1 or they are I(1) series 
because they contain unit root in level, but contain no unit root in first differences. The time 
series property of the data enables the conduct of cointegration test. 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 Cointegration Analysis 
An empirical model that identifis long-run relationship among the policy rate, real GDP and 
price level is expressed as: 
                                                    tttt ecpbyar +++=                                                 (1) 
where r is the log of policy rate, y is the log of real GDP, and p is the log of price level measured 
by CPI. Given that the variables are found to be integrated of order one, Johansen cointegration 
tests proposed by Johansen and Juselius (1990) and Johansen (1991) without deterministic trend 
are used. The tests employ the maximum likelihood procedure to determine the existence of 
cointegrating equations in nonstationary time series as a VAR model. The reduced form VAR 
model of order p is expressed as: 
                   ttptpttt exxxxx ++∆Γ++∆Γ+∆Γ+=∆ −−−−−− 1
/
112211 ............... αβµ           (2) 
where x is a vector of first differences of nonstationary variables, Γi is the matrix of short-run 
parameters, and /αβ is the information coefficient matrix between the levels of nonstationary 
series. The relevant elements of the matrix α are adjusted coefficients while the matrix β contains 
cointetrating equations. There are two likelihood ratio test statistics for the number of 
cointegrating equations, i.e., trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics. If the two test statistics are 
greater than the critical values at the 5% level of significance, cointegrating equation(s) will exist.  
2.2.2 Short-Run Dynamics 
The existence of cointegration allows for an analysis of short-run dynamics. The ECM based on 
equation (1) is expressed as: 
                             ttitiitit
k
i
it uepyrr ++∆+∆+∆+=∆ −−−−
=
∑ 1
1
][ λδγβµ                          (3) 
The coefficient of the error-correction term (et-1) captures the short-run adjustment while the 
short-run dynamics are depicted by the coefficients of the lagged values of first differences of all 
series. The optimal lag for the ECM model, k, can be selected by various criteria. However, the 
ECM model should pass diagnostic tests, specifically serial correlation test, heteroscedasticity and 
normality tests of the residual of the model. Equation (3) can be used to perform short-run and 
long-run causality analysis. 
It should be noted that equation (1) does not represent the Taylor-type rule. However, partial 
adjustment can be perfectly captured by the dynamics of the model in equation (3) when only 
one cointegrating relation is found. In other words, equation (3) is the short-run interest rate 
equation (Eleftheriou, 2009). 
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3. Empirical Results 
In this section, the results of cointegration tests, short-run dynamics, causality tests and impulse 
response analysis are presented.  
3.1 Long-Run Relationship  
Since all variables are I(1) series as shown by the results of unit root test reported in Table 1, 
Johansen cointegration tests without deterministic trend are performed with the lag of 2 
determined by Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). The simple model with three variables [rt, yt, 
pt] is estimated. The results are reported in Table 2. 
Table 2 Results of Cointegration Tests. 
A: Trace Test 
Coint. Rank Trace statistic 5% Critical value p-value 
None* 32.024 29.797 0.027 
Almost 1 9.572 15.495 0.315 
Almost 2 3.367 3.841 0.067 
B: Max Eigenvalue Test 
Coint. Rank Max-Eigen statistic 5% Critical value p-value 
None* 22.453 21.132 0.032 
Almost 1 6.204 14.265 0.587 
Almost 2 3.367 3.841 0.067 
Note: * denotes rejection of the hull hypothesis of no cointegration at the 5% level, p-values 
are provided by MacKinnon et al. (1999). 
 
The results in Table 2 show that there is one cointegrating relationship among the log of policy 
rate, the log of real GDP, and the log of price level.  
The estimated long-run relationship between the policy rate and the other two macroeconomic 
variables is: 
                                          rt = 12.367**yt -16.206**pt                                                   (4) 
                                               (4.533)         (0.076) 
                                               [2.728]         [-2.667] 
Note: Standard error is in parenthesis, t-statistic is in bracket, and ** indicates significance at the 
5 percent level. 
The long-run relationship between the policy rate and the two indicators (output and price level) 
does not bear a resemblance to a Taylor-type rule for the interest rate.  The estimated long-run 
equilibrium equation shows that real GDP (y) is positively related to the policy rate (r). Equation 
(4) cannot be interpreted as an IS curve because output is not negatively related to interest rate. 
The estimated coefficient is large, which indicates that a 1 percent increase in real GDP causes 
the policy rate to increase by 12.37 percent. However, this positive relationship is consistent with 
the policy stance of the Bank of Thailand. Regarding the impact of price level, the price level is 
negatively related to the policy rate, i.e., a 1 percent increase in price level causes the policy rate 
to decrease by 16.21 percent. This phenomenon indicates the lack of the Fisher effect since 
nominal interest rate will not be positively adjusted to the rate of inflation  
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It should be noted that the positive relationship between real GDP and the policy rate might 
seem reasonable. As a matter of fact, the policy rate is used by the Bank of Thailand to signal its 
monetary stance. This rate is adjusted to accommodate economic growth. In other words, this 
rate is raised when the growth rate is high and vice versa. Therefore, the positive relationship 
between the two variables is observed.  
3.2 Short-Run Dynamics 
The finding of one cointegrating equation enables an estimation of short-run dynamics from the 
ECM framework. The partial adjustment that is captured by the dynamics of the estimated 
model representing the short-run interest rate equation is: 
      ∆rt  =  - 0.121***et-1   + 0.310** ∆rr-1  + 0.148 ∆rt-2 – 0.814** ∆yt-1 – 0.871** ∆yt-2   
                  (0.031)              (0.144)             (0.120)          (0.383)           (0.349) 
                  [3.863]               [2.162]             [1.225]          [-2.125]          [-2.494] 
                                                                                                                                      (5) 
                + 7.784*** ∆pt-1 + 0.316 ∆pt-2 – 0.056** 
                   (1.139)               (1.572)        (0.019) 
                   [6.836]                [1.473]        [-2.978] 
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.660, F = 12.642 
Diagnostic Tests:  
Serial Correlation: LM Statistic =  9.133 (p-value = 0.289) 
Heteroskedasticity: χ2(2) = 85.162 (p-value = 0.444) 
Normalilty: Jarque-Bera Statistic = 1.167 (p-value = 0.558) 
Note: Standard error is in parenthesis, t-statistic is in bracket, and *** and ** indicates 
significance at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively. 
  
Since there exists one cointegrating relation, only one ECM model can be analyzed. As 
mentioned in Section 2, various criteria can be used to select the optimal lag order of the ECM 
model. Since the sample size is relatively small, the lag order of 2 determined by SIC is used, and 
necessary diagnostic tests are performed. The estimated ECM passes diagnostic tests for serial 
correlation because the LM statistic shows that the null hypothesis of no serial correlation cannot 
be rejected. The Chi-square statistic also reveals that the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity 
is accepted and thus the estimated model contains constant variances. In addition, the Jarque-
Bera statistic indicates the absence of non-normality in the residuals. 
The estimated coefficient of the error-correction term (et-1) in the interest rate equation captures 
the adjustment to the long-run equilibrium relationship. This coefficient is negative and 
significant at the 1% level. This coefficient has the absolute value of less than one, which 
indicating that any deviation from the long-run equilibrium will be corrected by monetary policy 
actions. Specifically, a negative 1 percent deviation from the equilibrium causes the policy rate to 
increase by 12 basis points in the next period. The significance of the estimated coefficient of the 
error-correction term also implies that the long-run relationship is stable. This finding is in line 
with the finding by Eleftheriou (2009) for the case of Germany. 
There are causal relationships running from output growth and inflation to the policy rate. Since 
the results in equation (5) allow for causality tests in both long-run and short-run causations. The 
results of causality tests are reported in Table 3. 
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Table 3 Results of Causality tests. 
Null Hypothesis Wald F-statistic p-value 
Growth and inflation does not cause the policy rate. 14.924*** 0.001 
Growth does not cause the policy rate. 3.868** 0.030 
Inflation does not cause the policy rate. 23.638*** 0.000 
Note: *** and ** indicate significance of the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively. 
 
The results in Table 3 are obtained from Wald coefficient restriction tests on the coefficient of 
the error-correction terms and the coefficients of lagged independent variables in equation (5). 
There is a long-run causality running from growth and inflation to the policy rate adjustment. In 
the short run, output growth causes the policy rate to fall while inflation causes the policy rate to 
rise. It can be concluded that the short-run adjustment seems to be different from the long-run 
adjustment. 
3.3 Impulse Responses 
In performing the estimation of the unrestricted VAR model, all variables in their first 
differences are used. The results of the analysis of impulse responses are shown in Figure 2. 
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              Figure 2. Impulse Responses of Policy Rate to Output Growth and Inflation. 
 
In Figure 2, the solid lines are point estimates of the impulse responses of the policy rate due to 
a one standard deviation of output growth and inflation.  The dashed lines contain the 95% error 
bands. The response horizon is in quarters. The response of the policy rate due to output shock 
shows that the policy rate increases with a lag of about one quarter. The rising of the policy rate 
does not last long enough because the policy rate starts falling in just four quarters and becoming 
negative. The output shock causes fluctuation in the policy rate. The response of the policy rate 
due to inflation shock shows that the policy rate also increases with a lag of about a quarter. The 
policy rate starts to decline within two quarters and becomes negative in the fourth quarter. 
However, the policy rate fluctuations seem to subside thereafter. As a result, the policy rate is 
affected by the shocks to growth rate and inflation. It should be noted that the implementation 
of inflation targeting by the Thai monetary authority might be a nominal anchor for monetary 
policy as mentioned by Clarida et al. (1998) because the impact of inflation shock seems to be 
less severe than the impact of growth shock.  
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3.4 Discussion 
This paper shows that the estimated interest rate equation explains the importance of economic 
growth and inflation on the adjustment of the policy rate quite well. Therefore, nonlinear models 
as investigated by Kim et al. (2005) might not be needed. However, the exchange rate and 
foreign interest rate are cannot included be included in this study due to a relatively small sample 
size. Furthermore, stock market stress mentioned by Baxa et al. (2013) is not included in the 
model. Therefore this study has some limitations. A larger model for estimation is left for future 
research. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper employs cointegration technique and VAR model to investigate the impact of output 
and price level on the policy rate in Thailand during the period that inflation targeting has been 
implementing. The results show that there exists a long-run relationship of the policy rate with 
real GDP and price level. The estimated short-run interest rate equation is obtained from short-
run dynamics. The estimated long-run equation seems to be stable because the coefficient of the 
error correction term has a negative sign with the absolute value of less than one. In addition, 
there are both short-run and long-run causations running from output growth and inflation to 
the policy rate adjustment. The impulse responses generated in this paper indicate that shocks to 
growth rate and inflation rate drive the policy rate cycle. Without inflation targeting, the 
variations of the policy rate might be larger. Therefore, policymakers should maintain the 
inflation targeting scheme for the success of monetary policy.  
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